Abstract. By the theory TT is meant the higher order predicate logic with the following recursively defined types:
§1. Introduction. Consider a form TT of the simple theory of types in which predicates of any number of arguments are admitted, but no functions. The types of such a predicate logic can be recursively defined as follows:
(1) 1 is the type of individuals and [] is the type of the truth values; (2) [τ 1 , . . . , τ n ] is the type of the predicates with arguments of the types τ 1 , . . . , τ n , where n ≥ 1.
Thus the type [τ 1 , . . . , τ n ] can be taken to be the type [] when n=0. Apart from notation and the exclusion of functions, the types of TT are the types of Schütte's type theory [26] . Although the types of TT are traditionally thought of as necessary for the consistency of the logic, the types can just as well be seen to arise naturally from the predicate and subject distinction of natural languages, for these become the distinction between a predicate and its argument(s). Skepticism has often been expressed that a violation of the type restrictions is the ultimate source of the paradoxes. For example, in the concluding paragraph of [6] Church comments on a remark of Frege's " . . . Frege's criticism seems to me still to retain much of its force, and to deserve serious consideration by those who hold that the simple theory of types is the final answer to the riddle of the paradoxes". Here, as in [27] and [28] , an alternative explanation of the paradoxes is offered; namely that they result from a confusion of use and mention when higher order predication is given a nominalist interpretation. A quote from the introduction to [25] is relevant: "Broadly, the result is an outlook which is less Platonic, or less realist in the medieval sense of the word. How far it is possible to go in the direction of nominalism remains, to my mind, and unsolved question, but one which, whether completely solvable or not, can only be adequately investigated by means of mathematical logic."
In the subsections of this introduction to follow, the motivation for the features of ITT that distinguish it from TT is described and some important results obtainable in ITT are sketched. The syntax of ITT is described in §2, the semantics in §3, and the proof theory in §4 in the style of semantic tableaux. A semantic consistency proof is provided in §5. A proof that cut is a redundant rule of the logic is provided in §6; it is an adaptation of the proofs for Schütte's type theory provided in [24] and [31] . Finally in §7 two extensions of ITT are described. The first introduces a notation for partial functions with values of type 1 in the traditional manner using definite descriptions; but its development within ITT permits simplifications of the syntax and semantics. The second extension of ITT demonstrates that a solution to the "riddle of the paradoxes" can be found by maintaining a careful distinction between the use and mention of predicate names in a nominalist interpretation of higher order predication. For example, in this consistent extension of ITT Russell's set can be defined. Details for both logics are provided in [18] .
1.1. Intensional and extensional identity. Following Carnap [5] , intensional and extensional identities are defined first before the intension and extension of terms are described. In TT these identities are defined:
∀X.[X(u) → X(v)])
Here the notation x is used as an abbreviation for x 1 , . . . , x n , where n ≥ 0. Using the usual infix notation for the identities, a theorem of TT is:
, where necessarily †[X] is not 1. The comparable result in the set theory ZF [29] is IEZF) ∀x, y.[x = y → x = e y] where here = is the primitive identity of a first order logic with identity; the sequent is actually a theorem of that logic. The converse of (IEZF), the axiom of extensionality, is the first axiom in the first formulation of ZF [32] . In TT the axiom is the converse of (IE.1), and is often accepted as an axiom of TT:
. An axiom of extensionality may be acceptable for a pure logic, but it is not for an applied logic trying to meet the needs of computer science. In the design of databases it is essential to understand the distinction between the intension of a predicate and its extension; the former may only be known informally while the latter is provided by data entry. Consider, for example, the extension of an Employee predicate in a company database. It will most likely be maintained by data entry along with a Sex predicate among others. From these two predicates the intension of a predicate MaleEmployee can be defined, and its extension retrieved and printed [15] . By an accident of hiring, however, the two predicates Employee and MaleEmployee may have the same extension; but clearly their intensions must be distinguished. Another example is provided by [22] where a distinction is made between "extensional" and "intensional" occurrences of predicate variables.
For this reason the axiom (EI) concluding the intensional identity of predicates from their extensional identity is not accepted in ITT. Instead rules of intensionality are part of the proof theory; they conclude that two predicates are intensionally identical if and only if their names are intensionally identical.
1.2. Nominalism and higher order predication. In a logic of extensions such as TT with (EI) as axiom, a higher order predicate with predicates as arguments is understood to have the extensions of the predicates as arguments. But in a logic in which the intension of a predicate is distinguished from its extension, higher order predication must be re-examined.
A nominalist understands a predicate of a universal to be a predicate of a name of the universal. For example, a nominalist understands 'Yellow is a colour' to mean 'Yellow is a colour-word'; the sentence is understood as a description of the use of the word 'Yellow' in English. Since computers are consummate nominalists, nominalist interpretations of languages intended for computer applications are needed. But this does require a careful distinction between the use and mention of predicate names, especially when treating abstraction and quantification. For example, in 'Yellow is a colour-word' the predicate name 'Yellow' is being mentioned while the predicate name 'colour-word' is being used.
The distinction between the use and mention of predicate names is maintained in the logic ITT as follows: The types of ITT are the same as the types of TT, but the membership of the type 1 of individuals in ITT is an extension of the membership of the same type in TT. The extension consists in adding to the membership of the type 1 any higher order term in which at most variables of type 1 have a free occurrence. A constant C that is a predicate name is necessarily of some type that is not 1 and always has that type in contexts where it is used. But since no variable has a free occurrence in C, C is also of type 1 and it has that type in contexts in which it is being mentioned. Thus C(C) is of type [] if C is of type [1] .
A related method of maintaining the distinction between the use and mention of predicate names was used in the predecessors of ITT described in [12] , [13] , [14] and [16] . The papers prior to [16] attempted to provide a formal set theory that maintains the distinction, but had an awkward notation among its failings. The logic NaDSyL described in [16] is a recent attempt to overcome these failings; for example, it uses the notation of the lambda calculus. But a closer study of NaDSyL has revealed that the technique it employs for maintaining the distinction could be employed more simply within a type theory.
Mentioning the name of a predicate means that the name is implicitly quoted. This is the reason why higher order terms that are also of type 1 must be restricted to those in which only variables of type 1 have free occurrences. For only such terms can be given a Herbrand interpretation when quoted. For example, let C be a constant of type [1] R = S R = e S. This scheme is similar to the scheme that would result from all possible instantiations of (IEZF) of ZF. As a consequence, the logic ITT combines features from set theory and from a lambda calculus based logic; for this reason it may satisfy the requirements for such a logic described in [20] .
Consider for example the following definitions of zero and successor
where =: [1, 1] . They are definitions in the style of set theory; but all of Peano's axioms are derivable in ITT including the following pair:
∀x.¬S(x) = 0. Dual typing is critical for their derivations: 0: [1] and S: [1, 1] , but also 0:1 and S(x):1 when x:1.
The lambda calculus definition of ordered pair from [7] is also available
and the following sequents can be derived:
∀x, y.¬ x, y = 0. Details are provided in [17] and [18] . Also provided there is a foundation for recursions. Both well-founded and non-well-founded recursive predicates are defined there using a decidable set of terms called recursion generators; the technique is demonstrated using higher order Horn sequent definitions. This method of defining recursive predicates overcomes some of the complications that arise from their introduction into the applied versions TPS, HOL, and PVS of Church's formulation of type theory. [1] , [19] , [23] .
Since non-well-founded predicates can be defined in ITT, there appears to be no obstacle to reproducing within ITT most of the applications of non-wellfounded sets described in [3] .
Acknowledgments. Comments by Nino Cocchiarella on an earlier paper and his [8] and [9] encouraged the change from the set theoretic notation of [14] to the lambda notation of [16] and ITT. An observation of Henk Barendregt was critical for the realization that the technique employed in [16] for maintaining the distinction between use and mention could be more simply maintained in ITT. Conversations with Alasdair Urquhart, Peter Apostoli, and Michael Donat have been helpful for details of this paper, as has correspondance with Hendrik Boom, Per Martin-Löf, and Joergen Villadsen. The paper has also benefitted from several recommendations made by a referee. §2. The syntax. Type membership for ITT is defined in §2.1, providing the basic syntax for the logic. The lambda reduction relation between terms of ITT is defined in §2.2. In §2.3 some more usual notations for predicate logics are introduced by definitions.
Type membership.
The logic ITT is assumed to have denumerably many constants and variables of each type. In the style of [7] , special constants introduce the logical connectives and the quantifiers. 
The unusual clause (4) results from the nominalist interpretation discussed in §1.2. The type 1 assigned to M in (4) is called the dual type of M . Because of this clause a constant c for which †[c] is not of type 1 has 1 as a dual type; nevertheless, †[c] is always to be understood to be the type assigned by the primitive syntax, that is the syntax of TT, and never the dual type 1 assigned by clause (4) . No variable has 1 as a dual type nor does a constant c for which
By a term is meant a member of a type. Note that a term of type 1 is a constant, a variable, or a term of dual type 1 since clauses (1) and (4) Clause (4) in the definition of type membership has little effect on the proofs provided in [2] for the theorem as demonstrated in [18] . The theorem ensures that by selecting one of the bound variable variants of a term in normal form as the representative normal form, a unique normal form may be assigned to each term of ITT.
Formula notations.
A formula of ITT is a term of type []. Formulas are the basis for the proof theory for ITT described in §4. But first the sparse notation of the lambda calculus is extended by definitions that introduce notations more common to predicate logics. The application notation is "sugared" by the definitions:
The prefix notation for ↓ is replaced by an infix notation, and the logical connectives ¬ and ∧ are defined; all other conventional connectives can be defined from them:
A conventional notation for the universal quantifier is defined, and the existential quantifier is defined from it in the usual way: The value of Φ in (V.1) is an ordered pair so that Φ 1 and Φ 2 can be defined to be the functions for which Φ(τ, M ) is Φ 1 (τ, M ), Φ 2 (τ, M ) . The value of Φ 1 (τ, M ) for the cases (V.2) to (V.6) to follow is defined to be the normal form of
where x 1 , . . . , x 1 are all the variables with a free occurrence in M . Since no free variable occurs in any Φ 1 ( †[x i ], x i ) , no variable has a free occurrence in Φ 1 (τ, M ) .
is defined in the remaining cases as follows:
, M) and is − otherwise.
For the last condition, Φ
x is an x-variant of Φ; that is, it is a valuation for which
, y) at most when y is x.
A proof of the following lemma is needed for the theorem of §3.2.
Lemma (Semantic Substitution). Let Φ be a valuation to some domain. Let Q: † [x] , where x has no free occurrence in Q, and let P :σ. Let
Proof. It may be assumed that x has a free occurrence in P . No matter the form and type τ of P , Φ
where x, x 1 , . . . , x n are all the variables with a free occurrence in P . Hence Φ
which is the normal form of
since none of the variables x 1 , . . . , x n have a free occurrence in
It follows by (V.4) that Φ x 2 (1, P ) is Φ 2 (1, [Q/x]P ) when P has dual type 1. It is sufficient, therefore to prove that Φ x 2 (σ, P ) is Φ 2 (σ, [Q/x]P ) when σ is not the dual type 1. The proof is by induction on ct[P ].
When ct[P ] is 0, P is necessarily x so the conclusion is immediate. Assume the conclusion of the lemma whenever ct[P ] < ct. Let ct[P ] be ct, and consider the forms that P may take.
• P is MN, where M :[τ, τ ], N :τ , and σ is [ τ ].
When τ is not empty, Φ x 2 (σ, P ) is the set of tuples e for which Φ
• P is λy.M , where it may be assumed that y has no free occurrence in Q and is not x.
When τ is not empty, Φ 
is ±, respectively, where = 1 is = of type [1, 1] , and = τ is = of type [τ, τ ].
Clause (IM.1) is the condition that originated with [21] for a valuation of type theory to be a model . Clause (IM.2) expresses that the intension of a predicate is identified with its name. For let Φ 2 ([], P = Q) be ±, where = : [1, 1] . Then since the terms P and Q occur in a type 1 context, they are being mentioned. From the fact that Φ 2 ([], P = Q) is ± it can be concluded that P and Q are identical, respectively, not identical terms and therefore must name intensionally identical, respectively, not identical predicates in the context P = Q when =:[τ, τ ]; that is, Φ 2 ([], P = Q) must be ±.
Theorem. Any valuation to the standard domain is an intensional model.
Proof. Let Φ be a valuation to the standard domain. That Φ satisfies (IM.1) is immediate. To prove that it satisfies (IM.2) it is sufficient to prove that for any type τ it satisfies the following condition:
, and expresses that Φ 1 (τ, P ) and Φ 1 (τ, Q) have the same normal form. That (IM.2) follows from (NF) is a consequence of the definition of domain given in §3.1. A proof of (NF) follows.
Thus any valuation to the standard domain satisfies (NF) and therefore both (IM.1) and (IM.2).
Semantic inferences.
Let the valuation Φ be a model of ITT. Since Φ is a function, the value Φ 2 (τ, M ) for M :τ is unique. In particular, if F :[] then Φ 2 ([], F ) has as its value exactly one of ±. This observation together with the following theorem provides the justification for the proof theory described in §4; a proof of the theorem, which depends on the substitution and semantic substitution lemmas, is left to the reader. A proof is available in [18] . 
Sequents and counter-examples.
A sequent is an expression Γ Θ where Γ, the antecedent of the sequent, and Θ, the succedent of the sequent are finite, possibly empty, sets of formulas. A sequent Γ Θ is satisfied by a valuation Φ, if Φ 2 ([], F ) is − for some F in the antecedent or is + for some F in the succedent. A sequent is valid if it is satisfied by every valuation that is a model. A valuation Φ is a counter-example for a sequent if Φ 2 ([], F ) is + for every F in the antecedent and − for every F in the succedent.
The proof theory of §4 provides a systematic search procedure for a counterexample for a given sequent Γ Θ. Should the procedure fail to find such a valuation, and if it does fail it will fail in a finite number of steps, then that Γ Θ is valid follows from a theorem of §5. The steps resulting in a failure are recorded as a derivation. Thus a derivation for a sequent is constructed under the assumption that a counter-example Φ exists for the sequent. Signed formulas are introduced to abbreviate assertions about the truth value assigned to a formula by Φ. Thus +F is to be understood as an abbreviation for "Φ 2 ([], F ) is +" and −F for "Φ 2 ([], F ) is −", for some conjectured counter-example Φ. Note that Γ Θ has no counter-example if Γ Θ has no counter-example, where Γ ⊆ Γ, Θ ⊆ Θ, and Γ ∪ Θ is not empty. §4. Proof theory. The proof theory is presented as a logic of sequents using a semantic tree form of the sequent calculus that has evolved from the semantic tableaux derivations of [4] . A similar proof theory for first order logic is described in [30] and in [11] . Semantic rules, in terms of which semantic trees are defined, are described in §4.1; these rules are motivated by the theorem of §3. 3 . A derivation of a sequent is a closed semantic tree based on the sequent, as these terms are defined in §4.2.
4.1. The semantic rules. There are four + and − pairs of rules for the propositional connective ↓, for the quantifier ∀, for λ and for intensionality. These rules are
The last rule has a character different from these logical rules. It has no premiss and two conclusions:
Although the Cut rule is redundant, it is neverthless a useful rule since it permits the reuse of derivations. [18] 4.2. Semantic trees and derivations. A semantic tree is a binary tree with nodes that are signed formulas. A semantic tree based on a given sequent is defined as follows:
(1) A tree with a single branch consisting of one or more nodes +F and −G, where F is from the antecedent and G is from the succedent of the sequent, is a semantic tree based on the sequent. These are the initial nodes of the tree. (2) Given a semantic tree based on a sequent, a tree obtained from it in any of the following ways is a semantic tree with the same initial nodes based on the sequent: (a) By attaching the conclusion of a single conclusion rule to the leaf of a branch that has a node that is the premiss of the rule, provided that if the rule is −∀ then the eigen variable has no free occurrence in the premiss of the rule or in any node above it. (b) By attaching the two conclusions of the +↓ rule on separate branches to the leaf of a branch that has a node that is the premiss of the rule. (c) By attaching +F and −F on separate branches to the leaf of a branch.
A branch of a semantic tree is closed if there is a closing pair of nodes +F and −F on the branch. A semantic tree is closed if each of its branches is closed. A derivation of a sequent is a closed semantic tree based on the sequent. §5. Consistency. Since by the theorem of §3.2 any valuation to the standard domain is an intensional model for ITT, there exist valid sequents. Their relationship with derivable sequents is expressed in the next theorem.
Theorem (Consistency). A derivable sequent of ITT is valid.
Proof. Consider a derivation for a sequent Γ Θ. Let η be any node of the derivation which does not have an initial node below it. Define Γ[η] and Θ[η] to be the sets of sentences F for which +F , respectively −F , is η itself or is a node above η. Thus if η is the last of the initial nodes of the derivation, Γ[η] ⊆ Γ and
is satisfied by a model, so is Γ Θ.
Define the height h(η) of a node η to be the maximum of the heights of η on branches on which it occurs, with its height on a branch being the number of nodes below it on the branch. Γ Θ will be shown to be valid by induction on h(η).
If h(η) = 0, then η is a leaf node of a branch of the derivation. Since the branch is closed, Γ Θ is valid. Assume therefore that h(η) > 0, and that there is a model Φ that is a counter-example for Γ Θ. Necessarily η is immediately above a conclusion η1 or conclusions η1 and η2 of one of the rules of deduction. There are therefore two main cases to consider corresponding to the single conclusion rules +↓, ±∀, ±λ, and ±Int, and to the two conclusion rules −↓ and Cut.
• For the single conclusion rules it is sufficient to illustrate the argument with the ±∀ rules with premiss ±∀P and conclusion respectively +P (t) and −P (y), where P :[τ ] and t, y:τ with y not occurring free in any node above the conclusion −P (y) of the rule −∀.
For the + case, 
Theorem (Completeness without Cut). A counter-example that is a model exists for each underivable sequent of ITT.
That cut is redundant is an immediate corollary since by the consistency theorem a derivable sequent is valid no matter whether cut is used in its derivation.
6.1. Underivable sets and semivaluations. A finite set Σ of signed formulas is said to be derivable if the sequent Σ + Σ − is derivable, where Σ + is {F | + F ∈ Σ} and Σ − is {F | − F ∈ Σ}. An infinite set Σ of signed sentences is derivable if some finite subset is derivable. An underivable set Σ is a semivaluation if it satisfies the following conditions:
and it is sufficient to prove for all
3) Assume now that (a) holds whenever ct[P ] < ct. Consider the terms P for which ct[P ] is ct.
• P is MN, where M : [τ, τ ] and N :τ . Assume τ is not empty. In this case it is sufficient to prove under the assumptions
The case τ is empty is left to the reader.
• P is (λx.M ), where M :[ τ ] and x:τ . Assume τ is not empty.
In this case it is sufficient to prove under the assumptions N * , s ∈ DΣ(τ ) and
In this case it is sufficient to prove that when ΦΣ(τ, N ) ∈ DΣ(τ ),
This completes the proof of the lemma.
By the lemma, ΦΣ is a model of ITT. By the corollary, the underivable set of signed sentences Σ 0 obtained from an underivable sequent is satisfied by ΦΣ. This completes the proof of the completeness theorem. §7. Extensions to ITT. A sketch is given in §7.1 of the logic ITTf that introduces a functional notation into ITT. In §7.2 an extension SITT of ITT is described in which such sets as Russell's can be consistently defined. Full details of the logics are provided in chapters 5 and 6 of [18] .
7.1. ITTf. A notation for total functions with values of type 1 is available in ITT in the form of higher order terms that are also first order terms. The term S defined in §1.3, for example, is used in this way: S(t) is a first order term when t is. Also syntactic sugaring provides a functional notation for total functions with values of type other than 1. But partial functions of n arguments can only be represented in ITT by predicates of n + 1 arguments, the extra argument being the value of the function. The logic ITTf is an extension of ITT with an explicit notation for partial or total functions with values of type 1.
The types of ITTf are the types of ITT. All the constants and variables of ITT are constants and variables of ITTf of the same type. But ITTf also has available the untyped symbol ι that is used to create function terms. The terms of ITTf are defined by adding the following clauses to the clauses (1)-(3) of §2.1: (4) Let M be a term of type [1] . Then ιM is a function term and term of type 1. (5) Let M be a term of type τ , τ =1, for which each free occurrence of a variable in M is either of type 1, or is an occurrence in a function term with a free occurrence in M . Then M is also a term of type 1. The proof theory of ITTf is obtained from the proof theory of ITT as follows:
• The +∀ rule for type 1 eigen terms has a second conclusion −Den(t), where Den df = (λu.u=u), in order to ensure that the eigen term t is denoting; Farmer in [10] and others use the notation ↓t to express the same thing.
• The λ rules are affected by a modification to the definition of β-reduction:
A term (λv.P )(t) is not contractible to [t/v]P if t is a term of type 1 in which a function term has a free occurrence. This change is necessary to ensure the proper scope for function terms.
• The terms P and Q of an Int rule must satisfy the additional requirement that no function term has a free occurrence in either.
• ι rules are added with premiss ±P ([ιM/v]t) and conclusion ±[∃!v.M ]P (t), where the variable v has no free occurrence in a function term with a free occurrence in t. This restriction is necessary to ensure the proper scope for function terms. A semantics for ITTf is provided by a mapping of terms of ITTf into terms of ITT. A proof of a completeness and cut-elimination theorem similar to the theorem of §6 is provided in [18] along with a proof that ITTf is a conservative extension of ITT.
7.2. Consistent uses of Russell's set. The variables of ITT have two distinct roles to play, as the eigen variable in the conclusion of an application of the −∀ rule, and as abstraction variables in the λ rules. These two roles can be served in formulas by syntactically distinct variables. An abstraction variable is used purely as a placeholder and need never be interpreted. But clearly the eigen variable of an application of the −∀ rule must receive a value. By using distinct variables for these two roles, and interpreting quantification variables as in ITT but interpreting abstraction variables as placeholders, a consistent extension of ITT can be constructed in which such impredicative sets as Russell's can be defined.
Each variable v of ITT has a unique type † [v] ; these variables are the quantifiable variables of the extended ITT. An abstraction variable v of the extended ITT on the other hand has a specified type † [v] , but also a dual type 1. This allows applications of abstraction not permitted in ITT. For example, it is not difficult to derive ¬0(0) in ITT, where 0 has been defined in §1. 3 . The first occurrence of 0 in 0(0) is of type [1] [18] .
